3. Methodology and Research design
To illustrate whether the prior findings on China’s position on secessionism in general have been consistent and have remained consistent over time in different cases of foreign secessionism, light will be shed on two separate yet very similar separatist cases in Africa: Somaliland and South Sudan. China has never recognized Somaliland, which declared its independence in 1991, but it has formally recognized South Sudan in 2011.
3.1 Variables
In this case study the dependent variable is China’s attitude towards secessionism. More specifically, the focus will be on China’s recognition of the new government of South Sudan, and its refusal to recognize the democratic government in Somaliland that aims to secede from Somalia. The independent variables with which these two cases will be compared stem from a grounded literature study on both China’s foreign policy and its relations with African countries in general, as well as from literature that is specifically focused on the two analyzed African regions.
The first independent variable is China’s view on secessionism in general. This variable is measured by comparing China’s statements about the Friendly Relations Declaration in the UN Charter with how both case studies apply to this declaration. Another indicator that could contribute to China’s view on both secessions is to what extent China’s domestic issues with respect to secession had been subject to international scrutiny at the time of the secession. This might explain China’s sensitivity to granting the external recognition or not.
The second independent variable that could explain China’s different reaction towards South Sudan compared to Somaliland, is how China’s foreign policy principles with respect to state sovereignty, non-interference and territorial integrity apply to both secession processes. More importantly, China’s actual emulation of these principles in both cases is compared. After explaining the chronological process of the secession, both cases will be evaluated on the basis of Kreuter’s (2010) typology in which he distinguishes three types of secession. Indicators that are part of these types of secession processes are: the nature of the previous relations between the parent state and the seceding state (e.g. violations of human rights, fair cooperation, war), which thus implies the level of violence that was generated through or before the secession process. Further indicators are the use of domestic law that has been used during the secession process (e.g. mutual agreements), whether there are any alternative solutions available other than secessionism, and the variety of the ethnic groups within the seceding region. The variety of the ethnic groups within the seceding regions could be relevant when their case is similar to one of the two problematic ethnic regions within China itself. The more sensitive the timing, the less likely it is that China will interfere in its diplomatic relations with the parent state, at the advantage of the secessionist case. Better understanding of the implications of these principles might provide more insight into why South Sudan was recognized and Somaliland was not.
The third independent variable is China’s political and economical involvement with both host- as secessionist-states at the moment that the secessionist movement claimed or attempted to reclaim its own territory. Expected is that the higher China’s involvement is, the higher the chance that China’s recognition of the secessionist movement could interfere with its relation with the parent state, and consequentially could harm its own interests. For the political aspect of China’s involvement, indicators are the establishment of important political organs, China’s behavior within important multilateral organizations with respect to the secession, the amount of political visits that are paid by official delegations of both countries, and the height of China’s aid, which in general is seen as a political catalyst for good business contracts (Alden 2009, p. 569).
Furthermore, the relative importance of the mutual trade in both regions will be measured with economic indicators such as official trade statistics. Some authors argue that the intensity of China-Africa bilateral economic and political relations are far more heavily dependent on the type of products that are being exchanged, rather than the similarity of the political structure of both countries (Eisenman 2012, p. 794, 795). Some types of products like raw materials or arms, are considered more important than others, like manufactured consumer goods or capital equipment. To confirm China’s increasing realist behavior, the fact that China supported South Sudan, and not Somaliland will be discussed with respect to the extent to which China benefited or contributed to its own future interests in both cases.
The last independent variable is the influence of China’s international growing power that presumably contributes to China’s changing role towards secessionism. According to Kerr and Xu (2014) China’s role in the UNSC is changing due to its normative convergence with respect to security situations. This is part of the literature that will be discussed about the normative opinion that growing power entails a growing responsibility towards other countries. An indicator for this variable is how proactively China reacts to the situations in both secession cases, politically and military. However for a weighted judgement on both cases, literature that spills a more negative view on China’s presence in Africa will also be addressed. This can be traced back through China’s attitude towards (and engagement in-) different institutions like the African Union, the UNSC, and the FOCAC.
Research design
The following case studies will address China’s position on the secessionist initiatives of Somaliland and South Sudan. For this, current literature on the history and political affairs of both countries will be used to create a chronology of events, but also to gain more understanding of the process of secession within these countries and China’s economical and political involvement there. To replicate logic to establish external validity, the same hypotheses and theory will be applied for both cases.
Case selection
According to Mill’s “method of difference” it is a key challenge to find cases that are as similar as possible, but that differ in their outcomes for they have all but one different independent variable. The cases of South Sudan and Somaliland have many similarities including, their relatively recent gain and loss of autonomy, their British colonial past, and their geographical position, but most importantly their (aspired) secession from another state after suppression and war. Aside from this, the outcomes of both cases differ, as one case has been recognized by China, while the other has not. Since there are also many differences between the two cases, it is not a perfect example of cross-case comparison. However, as this is never possible for case comparison in the field of political science, the second challenge is to demonstrate that the difference in the value of the independent variable of interest between the two cases is the one accounting for the difference in outcomes, rather than the residual differences between the two cases identified by rival hypotheses.
An important difference between the two cases is the timeframe during which both secessionist regions aimed to secede and asked for recognition from the international arena. Somaliland tried to become independent from 1991 onwards, whereas South Sudan officially made its first efforts in 2005. In the meantime change may have occurred respect to the prior mentioned independent variables used to compare the two secession cases. Therefore, a chronological order of events will be attained, meaning Somaliland will be discussed first, followed by South Sudan.
Data collection & Methods
The key method for the comparison of two similar cases is process tracing, which will be used in this case study. To compare the two cases, an inductive method will be used by testing the prior formulated hypotheses against findings retrieved from the scientific political theory literature and relevant primary or statistical data. Most of the independent variables in relation to the secession process will be measured with help from secondary sources such as the general political science and international law literature, as well as economic and diplomatic reports (mainly online through e.g. embassy’s websites).
To obtain a clear view of China’s attitude towards secessionism in general official statements will be used that can be retrieved from different organizations or news sources on the Internet. One of the primary sources in which China’ expresses its attitude towards secessionism, will be a court hearing of the International Court of Justice from 2009. In addition, general literature about China’s foreign policies and domestic secessionist issues will be used. Since both are extremely sensitive subjects for Beijing, most of the literature stems from Western experts in the field. However, it seems that China’s International legal scholars have more freedom of expression than their political science counterparts. According to Kim (1987: 7) this is due to the fact that International law is seen as an instrument for International Relations or International politics. As a consequence, international law is a less sensitive perspective for Chinese scholars to discuss China’s foreign policy. This is also why a relatively large portion of the chosen literature is related to international law. As the first two hypotheses theoretically highly intertwine and both apply to the aforementioned data, they will be discussed in a common chapter in the case study.
China’s political and economical involvement within the two cases will further be analyzed using official statements from key Chinese institutes that are involved in China’s activities in Africa, such as the FOCAC, relevant ministries of foreign affairs, relevant trade organizations, China’s embassies, and as an example, China’s Development Bank. In addition, reports of relevant NGO’s in the field may provide more details. For the opaqueness of China’s money flows, the height of China’s aid will be measured with available data from Aid Data, which is an open data source that registers China’s aid projects.
To measure the influence of China’s growing power with respect to granting recognition to a secessionist state, first light will be shed on the international perception of China’s power at the time of the secession. In addition, relevant political science theory literature will be advised to explain China’s conduct with respect to other nations. Most content that will be advised for the case studies will consist of secondary sources, namely relevant political articles, media reports and statements on official government websites.
[su_button url=”https://saxafimedia.com/fine-line-chinese-recognition-case-study-somaliland-and-south-sudan/6/” style=”soft” size=”12″ wide=”yes” center=”yes” text_shadow=”0px 0px 0px #FFFFFF” rel=”lightbox”]CONTINUE READING ON CASE STUDY – SOMALILAND >[/su_button]
