A leaked hydrocarbons agreement reveals the Ottoman Empire is back and Turkey will take up to 90% of Somalia’s oil and gas output, bypass Somali law, and export freely abroad — raising constitutional, economic, and sovereignty concerns
Investigative Analysis
When Somalia’s government quietly signed a far-reaching hydrocarbons agreement with Türkiye in March 2024, few details were disclosed to the Somali public or its parliament. More than a year later, the release of the full text — not in Mogadishu, but through ratification proceedings in Ankara — has exposed what critics describe as one of the most asymmetrical resource contracts in Somalia’s modern history.
The agreement, formally titled Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Türkiye and the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia in the Field of Hydrocarbons, was signed in Istanbul by Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar and Somali Petroleum Minister Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, under the political patronage of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
At its core, the deal grants Turkey — primarily through the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation — control over up to 90 percent of annual oil and gas production as “cost petroleum” before any profit-sharing takes place. Somalia, by contrast, is capped at a 5 percent royalty, payable either in cash or in kind.
“This is not a partnership; it is extraction dressed up as cooperation,” said a former Somali energy official, speaking on condition of anonymity due to security concerns. “The Somali state assumes the political risk. Turkey captures the upside.”
A Deal Outside Somali Law
Perhaps most controversially, the agreement bypassed Somalia’s Federal Parliament, raising constitutional questions in a country where natural resources are explicitly designated as national assets requiring legislative oversight.
Under the contract, disputes are not adjudicated under Somali law. Instead, arbitration is seated in Istanbul, invoking protections under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). “You cannot meaningfully claim sovereignty while outsourcing your courts,” said a Mogadishu-based constitutional lawyer. “This effectively removes Somalia from its own resource governance.”
Turkey is also exempted from paying signature bonuses, surface fees, or administrative costs — standard features of petroleum contracts worldwide. Article 4.5 explicitly waives these obligations, a concession rarely granted even in fragile states.
Export Freedom, No Local Obligations
The agreement allows Turkey to export and sell hydrocarbons freely on international markets, retaining all proceeds from its share without Somali approval. There are no binding requirements for local employment, technology transfer, or downstream investment inside Somalia.
Article 4.3 further permits Turkish entities to assign or transfer their rights to third parties without establishing a local company, effectively turning Somalia’s offshore reserves into tradable assets controlled from abroad.
“It’s remarkable,” said a regional energy analyst in Nairobi. “Somalia supplies the geology and legitimacy. Turkey supplies the flag.”
Gunboats and Geology
The hydrocarbons deal is tightly linked to Turkey’s expanding military footprint in Somalia. Ankara’s largest overseas base — the Turkish Task Force Command in Somalia — already trains Somali forces. Under Article 6, Turkey is authorized to deploy its own security assets to protect exploration activities, with all associated costs recoverable as petroleum expenses.
Beginning in late 2025, Turkey plans to deploy the seismic research vessel Oruç Reis, escorted by five naval warships, to Somali waters — a move framed by Ankara as counter-piracy protection but viewed by critics as resource militarization.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has publicly linked Somalia to Turkey’s broader “Africa Opening Strategy,” emphasizing maritime security, energy access, and geopolitical reach across the Gulf of Aden.
Opposition and Regional Fallout
Inside Turkey, opposition figures have also raised concerns. Yankı Bağcıoğlu, deputy chair of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), questioned why expensive deep-sea assets — sidelined in the eastern Mediterranean — are now deployed in Somalia. He warned that Ankara’s Somalia policy could inflame tensions with Ethiopia and complicate regional diplomacy.
Indeed, the deal builds on a February 2024 memorandum granting Turkey privileged access to Somalia’s exclusive economic zone, alongside defense commitments that blur the line between commercial investment and strategic control.
Who Benefits?
Somali officials defend the agreement as a necessary trade-off in a high-risk investment environment. But critics argue the structure all but guarantees that Somalia’s citizens see little benefit, even if hydrocarbons are discovered in commercially viable quantities.
“This is not development,” said a Somali civil society advocate. “It is dependency with a flag.”
For a country emerging from decades of conflict, the question now confronting Somalia is not whether it needs partners — but whether it can afford deals that mortgage sovereignty for promises of future stability.
