In the article “There’s a Rare Opportunity to Deepen US-Somaliland Ties. But Several Obstacles Stand in the Way” by Maxwell Webb, the author discusses the potential for stronger relations between the United States and Somaliland, particularly following the recent presidential election where Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro) replaced incumbent President Muse Bihi Abdi. It suggests that a new chapter in US-Somaliland relations may emerge with a new political landscape, especially with President Donald Trump potentially recognizing Somaliland.
Recognizing Somaliland could affirm its democratic progress and enhance regional trade links, particularly with Ethiopia, while also establishing Somaliland as a security partner in a volatile area. However, there are several challenges to consider, including the risk of destabilizing Somalia, tensions with other US allies like Turkey and Egypt, and the need for bipartisan support to avoid the perception of a partisan issue.
The author emphasizes the strategic importance of Somaliland due to its location along a vital trade route and its proximity to conflict areas like Yemen and the Horn of Africa. While there is hopeful momentum for recognition, several factors—such as US focus on other regions, strong ties between Egypt and Somalia, and reluctance to upset the current security dynamics—may hinder progress.
Despite these challenges, the new leadership in Somaliland under Irro could foster renewed engagement with the US. To capitalize on this, Somaliland will need to engage diplomatically with both Republican and Democratic leaders and emphasize its democratic achievements. Conversely, the US should acknowledge Somaliland’s stability and strategic location to forge a meaningful partnership while navigating the complexities of the region’s politics.
The complete article is as follows:
There’s a Rare Opportunity to Deepen US-Somaliland Ties. But Several Obstacles Stand in the Way
New administrations in both Washington and Hargeisa could begin a new chapter of relations.
On November 13, Somalilanders voted in their fourth presidential election since the self-governing region of Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia in 1991. In the end, Somaliland rejected incumbent President Muse Bihi Abdi and his Kulmiye party, electing in his place Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (also known as Irro), leader of the Waddani party, who was sworn in last week. As new administrations take office in both Washington and Hargeisa, a new chapter of relations between the United States and Somaliland may be beginning.
Recent reports have indicated that President-elect Donald Trump is poised to recognize Somaliland. Such recognition would be beneficial for several reasons—it reflects the reality on the ground, acknowledges and rewards Somaliland for building a successful democracy, and could help deepen regional trade with key US partners such as Ethiopia. It could also encourage a pro-Somaliland cadre of nations to follow suit and would allow the United States to develop a beneficial security partner in a challenging region of the world.
However, the United States should also proceed with caution. Moving too quickly could destabilize the Somalia security sphere, empowering al-Shabaab and angering other US partners, such as Turkey, Egypt, and the African Union. Moving forward without bipartisan support could also give the impression that the matter of Somaliland’s recognition is backed exclusively by the Republican Party, jeopardizing the effort.
In lieu of recognition, the United States should consider deepening the US-Somaliland partnership across other sectors: for example, security, diplomatic, business, and trade. That would be a good first step, and such a partnership (even without full recognition) would still be positive for Somaliland.
Over the past eight years, Somaliland’s strategic location along the Gulf of Aden has led US officials from both the Trump and Biden administrations to look more closely at the US-Somaliland relationship. Somaliland is located at the intersection of several converging US interests, as it is host to hundreds of miles of peaceful coastline along one of the world’s busiest trade routes. It is also strategically located near Yemen, where the Houthis have become increasingly emboldened against US allies and disruptive for Red Sea maritime trade since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war.
A deeper partnership with Somaliland would also allow the United States to keep a watchful eye on the conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as the fight against al-Shabaab in Somalia. It could also help relieve the military congestion in Djibouti, freeing up the United States to more flexibly operate against national security threats in the wider Red Sea security arena.
However, there are several factors that could hinder the prospects for an expanded US-Somaliland partnership. The United States’ focus on other regions, US relations with Egypt’s anti-Somaliland leadership, and the potential for Somaliland to become a partisan US political issue all risk derailing the potential benefits of deeper cooperation between Washington and Hargeisa.
Opportunity for renewed support
Under the first Trump administration, Somaliland was embraced by the United States to an unprecedented degree. Several officials working on Africa under Trump were advocates of recognizing Somaliland. Simultaneously, Somaliland was able to build bases of support with congressional Republicans and conservative policy institutions close to the president. Though Trump formally supported a “One-Somalia” policy (standard US policy, though often championed by Democrats), his National Security Council praised Taiwan’s recognition of Somaliland and the president withdrew US forces from Somalia, a sign interpreted by Somalilanders as a pivot toward a new Somalia doctrine in Washington.
Under the Biden administration, bipartisan US-Somaliland ties continued to grow. Top officials from Somaliland’s government, including a delegation led by Abdi, visited Washington to meet with leaders in Congress and the administration. Furthermore, both houses of the US Congress introduced key Somaliland-related legislation, including provisions for greater collaboration with the Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland in the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
Additionally, the commander of US Africa Command visited Hargeisa, meeting with Abdi, in 2022; and a delegation of congressional staffers (from senior policy analysts to chiefs of staff) visited Somaliland in June. Just this month, US Ambassador to Somalia Richard H. Riley and Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa Major General Brian T. Cashman were in Somaliland for meetings with both Abdi and Irro.
However, Democrats in Washington continued to leave Somalilanders frustrated. Though bipartisan, most of the US support for recognizing Somaliland continues to be led by Republicans and conservative policy analysts. Republicans introduced pro-Somaliland legislation to Congress, but the bills were ultimately rejected in both the House and the Senate.
Additionally, the Biden administration continued to favor Somalia over Somaliland rhetorically and in practice, once again deploying US troops to Somalia, training Somalia’s Danab special forces, and building new bases for the Somali military. The Biden administration also excluded Somaliland representatives from the 2022 US-Africa Leaders Summit and was publicly critical of the Somaliland government.
With Trump returning to office in January and Republicans resuming control of the House and the Senate, many in Somaliland are optimistic that their cause could take a prominent place in US foreign policy. One can expect the Trump administration to again install pro-Somaliland aides and advisers to positions of influence. With wars raging in the Middle East, just north of the Horn of Africa, the new US administration may be motivated to deepen security ties with Somaliland.
With control of both houses of Congress, Republicans will also have a better chance of passing pro-Somaliland legislation. Additionally, countering Chinese influence is likely to be a cornerstone of Trump’s second-term foreign policy. Somaliland’s relationship with Taiwan—and rejection of Chinese engagement—could potentially therefore play a role in the years to come. What’s more, Trump has a proven track record of making untraditional foreign policy decisions, such as when he recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara in 2020 (a move that happened in the context of Morocco normalizing relations with Israel).
While the context behind the Western Sahara case differs from that around Somaliland, Trump’s willingness to reverse longstanding US policy regarding Africa could favor Somaliland come January. The Trump administration is also likely to be frustrated with Somalia, where stalled counterterrorism efforts, an increase in al-Shabaab activity, and electoral reform issues paint Somalia as an unreliable partner. If Trump feels that the United States is not benefiting from its investment in Somalia, he may look for partners elsewhere in the region.
Challenges ahead
Nevertheless, it is the unpredictability of Trump’s politics that directly challenges Somaliland’s progress in its quest for recognition. Increasingly, isolationist foreign policy has become a trend within the Republican Party. On the one hand, questioning and challenging the institutions and precedents that hold back Somaliland’s recognition prospects may help its cause. But completely withdrawing from those institutions, or being unwilling to cooperate with them, could leave Somaliland, and the entire African continent, behind.
Engagement with Africa was not a pillar of the first Trump administration’s “America first” foreign policy. But the Biden administration pushed for the African Union to be a permanent member of the Group of Twenty (G20) and advocated for African nations to be given permanent seats in the UN Security Council.
Based on his first administration’s foreign policy, Trump is very likely to deprioritize bolstering Africa’s inclusion in international institutions, as he will be focusing on the wars raging in Europe and the Middle East, challenges around the US-Mexico border, and increasing tension with China. For Somaliland to play a role in global affairs, and sell itself as a partner worth investing in, it will have to garner attention from the Trump administration at a challenging time.
Additionally, Egypt may be another major roadblock to Somaliland’s relationship with Trump. For several reasons—such as Ethiopia’s building a dam on the Nile River and the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by Somaliland and Ethiopia earlier this year—Egypt has become a major supporter of Somalia. Included in this support are weapons and training for Somalia’s military. Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Sisi also have a close relationship, with the former calling the latter a “good man” and claiming the Egyptian leader has done “a fantastic job” with his country in 2019.
With Egypt under pressure internally and externally, Trump looking to quickly end the war in Gaza, and both Sisi and Trump looking to expand and deepen relations between the United States and Egypt and its partners, these two leaders are almost certain to strengthen their ties. It is unlikely that Trump would want to squander relations with Sisi over Somaliland in the near future.
Relatedly, as of last week, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to begin working on resolving their tension over the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU, which granted landlocked Ethiopia sea access. After talks on December 11, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to set up commercial arrangements that would allow Ethiopia “reliable, secure, and sustainable access to and from the sea.”
However, it is still unclear whether these new commitments—negotiated by Turkey, a key partner to Somalia and Egypt—will impact the MOU and Ethiopia-Somaliland relations. However, if relations between Somalia and Ethiopia are to improve, the Trump administration may step further away from greater engagement with Somaliland out of concern over adding to destabilization in the region.
Longstanding US policy priorities—most importantly the fight against al-Shabaab—might also prevent the Trump administration from fully shifting course. Despite its many challenges, the Federal Government of Somalia still remains an active US partner in the fight against al-Shabaab and other militant groups in the Horn. Additionally, the recent rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham in Somalia, with the affiliate setting up base in Puntland, may cause the Trump administration to proceed with caution as it approaches Somalia policy.
Moreover, at the end of this year, the African Union mission in Somalia is undergoing a transition, with new forces coming in and a new mandate taking place. This period of transition will be very fragile, and a new Trump administration may not be willing to make immediate moves that would jeopardize the success of any apparatus aimed at fighting Islamic militants in the Horn.
On top of all of this, Somalia is currently facing its own internal problems, with tensions rapidly rising between the federal government and the government of Jubaland. All of this is to say that, while the Trump administration has good reason to engage with Somaliland, the fear of further destabilizing an already precarious situation in Somalia may cause the White House to use caution around the issue of recognition.
Finally, Somaliland’s core supporters in the US government are Republican politicians and conservative analysts in mostly right-wing policy spaces. While this support is important, if Somaliland becomes a focal point of Trump’s foreign policy, it risks its recognition becoming a partisan issue and could face backlash the next time the Democratic Party retakes the White House. If Somaliland works to bolster support for its cause only among the Republican Party, it could hurt its own quest for recognition.
The path forward
Despite these challenges, politics within Somaliland may provide the necessary boost to surpass the challenges of the moment. Following the election, it was announced that Irro and the Waddani party won with 64 percent of the vote. The election has been praised by international partners, including the United States, as being free, fair, and well-executed. Irro ran on the notion of unifying Somaliland amid internal division and on reforming the economy to stabilize the country’s finances.
On foreign policy, Irro has expressed frustration with the lack of transparency around the memorandum of understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia and is expected to take a more nuanced approach to the agreement, while still supporting it. Moreover, he has stated a commitment to resolving the conflict in the eastern regions of Sool and Sanaag, an issue that has not only divided the country and hurt it economically but also drew concern from international partners, particularly the United States. Irro has expressed interest in continuing to build relations with Washington, and he offered Trump congratulations for his election victory.
The Irro administration will have a chance to reenergize relations with the United States and overcome any hurdles it might face with Trump. As far as US partners in East Africa, Irro could be an appealing choice for the Trump administration, as the new US president will be looking for opportunities to end conflict and resolve regional tension, and Irro is likely to lead a more nuanced approach to foreign policy. With key Trump allies having contributed to the praise of Somaliland’s elections, a successful democratic transition in the coming months will send a big signal to the incoming US administration of Somaliland’s reliability as a partner.
This isn’t to say that US-Somaliland relations still don’t face an uphill battle. Somalilanders will need to undertake robust and active diplomacy with both Republicans and Democrats to capitalize on the momentum of their election. The Irro administration will need to double down on its efforts to demonstrate Somaliland’s value to the United States and make a larger push to appeal to Democrats and diversify their base of support.
Meanwhile, the United States needs to take Somaliland’s success as a democracy seriously. There are real opportunities for partnership across sectors. The United States must take advantage of Somaliland’s key strategic positioning against US adversaries, including China, or else lose the opportunity to develop a democratic partner in an important region.
