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The United States is considering normalizing ties with Eritrea, weighing sanctions relief amid rising Red Sea tensions, Iran threats, and shifting geopolitical priorities in the Horn of Africa

WASHINGTON — The United States is quietly exploring a potential reset in relations with Eritrea, a long-isolated state on the Red Sea whose strategic geography has taken on renewed urgency amid escalating tensions in the Middle East and growing threats to global shipping lanes.

According to multiple officials and sources familiar with internal deliberations, recent diplomatic contacts signal a tentative shift in U.S. policy toward Eritrea, a country often described by Western analysts as one of the world’s most closed and authoritarian regimes. The outreach, first reported by The Wall Street Journal and Semafor, reflects Washington’s evolving calculus as maritime chokepoints linking Europe, the Middle East and Asia face mounting pressure.

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At the center of the effort is Massad Boulos, a senior envoy for Africa under President Donald Trump, who has held meetings with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Cairo in talks facilitated by Egypt. Additional meetings are expected in the coming weeks, according to sources briefed on the discussions.

While the U.S. State Department has declined to comment publicly on the specifics, one person familiar with internal thinking said the prospect of normalizing relations “has been in the works for a very long time,” suggesting that the initiative predates the latest regional crises.

Strategic Imperatives Drive Policy Shift

The renewed interest in Eritrea comes against the backdrop of intensifying geopolitical competition over the Red Sea — a vital artery for global trade and military operations. The waterway connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean via the Bab al-Mandeb strait, making it indispensable for energy shipments and commercial traffic.

Recent threats by Iran-aligned Houthi forces in Yemen to disrupt maritime flows — alongside broader tensions involving Tehran and Washington — have elevated the urgency of securing alternative routes and partnerships. The Red Sea now serves as a critical fallback corridor as instability affects the Strait of Hormuz, another key oil transit chokepoint.

Eritrea’s more than 700-mile coastline places it in a potentially pivotal role in this emerging strategic landscape. U.S. officials and analysts say that re-engagement with Asmara could offer Washington a foothold in a region increasingly contested by rival powers, including China and Russia.

Neighboring Djibouti already hosts a dense concentration of foreign military bases, underscoring the region’s importance. Eritrea, by contrast, has remained largely outside such arrangements — a factor that some U.S. policymakers now view as both a risk and an opportunity.

Sanctions Relief Under Consideration

As part of the diplomatic overtures, U.S. officials are reportedly weighing the possibility of easing sanctions on Eritrea — a move that would mark a significant departure from decades of limited engagement and punitive measures tied to human rights concerns and regional destabilization.

The proposal remains under review and has not been finalized, officials caution. Still, some within the administration argue that the current policy of isolation has yielded little strategic benefit.

“The Red Sea is too important for the U.S. not to test new approaches,” said one person familiar with the discussions, describing sanctions relief as a potential incentive to bring Eritrea into more structured dialogue.

U.S. Explores Reset With Eritrea as Red Sea Tensions Reshape Global StrategyDeep Skepticism Among Analysts

Despite the strategic rationale, the initiative faces significant skepticism from regional experts and former U.S. officials, many of whom question whether engagement with Eritrea’s leadership can produce meaningful change.

“Every U.S. administration eventually convinces itself it can manage Isaias,” said Cameron Hudson, a former White House and State Department official. “That assumption has historically proven flawed.”

Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, has since evolved into a highly centralized state under Afwerki’s rule. International watchdogs consistently rank it among the most repressive governments globally, citing indefinite military conscription, restrictions on religious freedom and widespread detention of political opponents.

Critics argue that lifting sanctions without clear concessions risks legitimizing entrenched authoritarian practices.

“Normally sanctions relief is tied to measurable progress,” Hudson said. “In this case, it’s unclear what Eritrea is offering in return.”

Regional Ripple Effects

Any U.S. policy shift toward Eritrea could reverberate across the Horn of Africa, a region already marked by fragile alliances and unresolved conflicts.

Officials warn that Ethiopia — which has periodically signaled ambitions for maritime access — could view closer U.S.-Eritrea ties as a complicating factor in its own strategic calculations. Tensions between Addis Ababa and Asmara have fluctuated sharply in recent years, raising concerns about the risk of renewed confrontation.

At the same time, Egypt’s role in facilitating talks highlights Cairo’s growing influence in Red Sea diplomacy, particularly as it navigates its own security concerns tied to regional waterways and trade routes.

A Calculated Gamble

For Washington, the potential reset represents a calculated gamble: balancing immediate strategic needs against longstanding concerns about governance and human rights.

The outcome remains uncertain. Internal debates within the administration — compounded by competing foreign policy priorities, including conflicts in Gaza and tensions with Iran — have slowed decision-making.

Still, the direction of travel is increasingly clear. As global power competition intensifies and maritime security becomes a defining issue of the decade, even the most isolated states are being reconsidered through a strategic lens.

Whether Eritrea proves a viable partner — or a persistent challenge — may depend less on diplomatic outreach than on the limits of what engagement can realistically achieve.