Israel’s recognition of Somaliland exposes contradictions in the African Union’s Somaliland policy, reviving debate over borders, precedent and regional stability. A former AU official argues the African Union’s stance is outdated, contradictory, and compromised by conflicts of interest — and that the AU is ignoring its own findings on Somaliland’s legal and democratic record
WASHINGTON — Israel’s decision on Dec. 26, 2025, to recognize the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign state has done more than reshape diplomatic calculations in the Horn of Africa. It has exposed what critics describe as a deep and unresolved contradiction at the heart of the African Union’s policy toward one of the continent’s most stable yet unrecognized polities.
For Somalilanders, the announcement marked long-sought validation of a political reality they have sustained for more than three decades. For the African Union, it prompted a swift and familiar response: condemnation grounded in the principle of colonial-era borders and warnings about the risks of precedent.
That reaction, argues Prof. Wafula Okumu — a former African Union staffer and a leading scholar of the institution — reflects an approach that is not only outdated, but fundamentally at odds with the AU’s own history, findings and professed values.
“Israel’s recognition sent a clear message to the international community,” Okumu writes. “It is time to acknowledge the political and legal realities of the Horn of Africa.” Instead, he says, the AU defaulted to “a rigid interpretation of colonial-era borders that is not only outdated but also riddled with contradictions.”
A reflexive response
The AU’s position rests on its long-standing commitment to the 1964 Cairo Resolution, which enshrines the inviolability of borders inherited at independence. In response to Israel’s move, AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf warned that recognizing Somaliland would set a “dangerous precedent” and threaten the “unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Somalia.”
To Okumu, that argument represents a selective reading of history — and a failure of institutional memory.
“This argument conveniently ignores the AU’s own 2005 fact-finding mission to Somaliland, which came to a starkly different conclusion,” he writes.
That mission, dispatched by the AU itself, examined the legal, political and historical basis of Somaliland’s claim. Its findings now stand in sharp contrast to the organization’s current posture.
A report the AU cannot escape
The 2005 report concluded that the 1960 union between Somaliland and Somalia was “never ratified” and had “malfunctioned,” resulting in “enormous injustice and suffering to the people of the region.” Far from framing Somaliland’s quest for recognition as destabilizing, the mission described it as “historically unique and self-justified in African political history.”
Crucially, the report rejected the very argument the AU now deploys. Somaliland’s case, it said, “should not be linked to the notion of ‘opening a Pandora’s box.’” Instead, the mission urged the AU to develop a “special method of dealing with this outstanding case.”
For Okumu, the implications are unavoidable. “The 2005 AU report is a damning indictment of the AU’s current stance,” he writes.
The mission also documented Somaliland’s political evolution since declaring independence in 1991. It praised the territory for “steadfastly laying the foundations of a democratic State, clothed with the relevant attributes of a ‘modern State.’” The report highlighted a constitution with separation of powers, the coexistence of traditional governance structures with elected institutions, active opposition parties and an emerging independent press.
Over more than three decades, Somaliland has maintained internal peace and built democratic institutions — a record that, as Okumu notes, stands in stark contrast to the chronic instability that has plagued Somalia.
Precedent, selectively applied
Despite this record, the AU has clung to what Okumu describes as a “dogmatic and outdated principle,” repudiating its own carefully considered findings in favor of reflexive opposition.
The oft-cited fear of precedent, he argues, rings hollow. The AU has already recognized the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia and South Sudan from Sudan — both cases involving violent conflict and the creation of new international borders.
“In both cases, the AU accepted the reality of new states born from conflict and political division,” Okumu writes. “Somaliland’s case is arguably stronger, as it is not creating a new border but restoring an old one.”
The 1960 union between Somaliland and Somalia, he emphasizes, was voluntary and never formally ratified by either side. That legal reality, Okumu argues, places Somaliland outside the typical framework of secessionist movements.
By refusing to engage with Somaliland, the AU is not preventing fragmentation, he says. “It is punishing a successful and democratic state for the failures of its neighbor, while simultaneously betraying its own institutional memory and established precedents.”
Questions of credibility at the top
Okumu’s critique goes beyond doctrine to the question of credibility. He argues that the AU’s stance is further compromised by a clear conflict of interest at the highest level of the AU Commission.
Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf is from Djibouti, a country whose economy is heavily dependent on port revenues. Djibouti is widely reported to derive up to 80 percent of its national income from port fees, with Ethiopia paying an estimated $1.5 billion to $2 billion annually for access to its ports.
The Ethiopia–Somaliland memorandum of understanding — which offers Ethiopia sea access in exchange for recognition — represents, in Okumu’s words, “a direct and existential threat to Djibouti’s economy.”
“For the AU Chairperson to be the primary voice of opposition to Somaliland’s recognition, when his own country has a direct and substantial financial interest in maintaining the status quo, is a serious conflict of interest,” Okumu writes. Such circumstances, he argues, undermine the AU’s credibility and raise doubts about the objectivity of its decision-making.
A choice before the AU
As international dynamics shift, Okumu argues that the African Union faces a defining choice: cling to an abstract and inconsistent interpretation of borders, or align its policies with reality, precedent and its own stated principles.
“It is time for the African Union to abandon its dogmatic, contradictory, and compromised stance on Somaliland,” he writes. Rather than issuing “reflexive condemnations,” the AU should revisit the conclusions of its 2005 mission and engage Somaliland “in a constructive and forward-looking manner.”
Recognition, Okumu insists, would not undermine African stability. On the contrary, it would “reward a successful democracy, promote regional peace, and uphold the very principles of self-determination and justice that the AU claims to champion.”
“The world is moving on,” he concludes, “and the AU risks being left behind, clinging to an outdated map that no longer reflects the reality on the ground.”
