U.S. Senator Ted Cruz Cites Beijing’s “Wolf Diplomacy” as Proof of Somaliland’s Strategic Value
China’s increasingly heavy-handed tactics in the Horn of Africa may be reinforcing the very outcome Beijing fears most: U.S. recognition of Somaliland.
What began as an exchange of barbed statements between Senator Ted Cruz and China’s embassy in Somalia has now spilled into a wider debate over great power competition, proxy conflict, and the future of maritime security in one of the world’s most strategic regions.
“The fact that the CCP is this upset is even further reason that the Administration should recognize Somaliland,” Cruz posted on X after Beijing denounced his August 14 letter urging Washington to formally recognize the territory as an independent state.
Beijing’s Wolf Diplomacy
China’s reaction was swift. Its embassy in Somalia blasted Cruz’s letter as a “baseless attack” and “serious interference,” while labeling Taiwan’s diplomatic mission in Hargeisa an “illegal” presence. Analysts say the response exemplifies “Wolf Warrior diplomacy,” Beijing’s preferred blend of intimidation and rhetorical escalation.
But the bluster may have backfired. “By overreacting, Beijing is effectively confirming Somaliland’s strategic importance,” said Michael Shurkin, a Horn of Africa expert and former CIA analyst. “It signals how desperate they are to prevent Washington from establishing a foothold on the Gulf of Aden.”
Allegations of Proxy Warfare
More troubling than rhetoric, however, are allegations that Beijing has begun to back armed proxies in Somaliland’s contested eastern regions.
Cruz’s letter cited reports that “the Chinese embassy in Somalia has chosen to directly fund and support these militias with weapons and ammunition” to punish Somaliland for ties with Taiwan and block any future U.S. military presence.
“This is not just local unrest—it’s a proxy conflict with global stakes,” argued one senior U.S. defense official, speaking on background. “If Beijing is arming groups in Somaliland while coordinating with Iran and the Houthis, it is part of a broader strategy to choke maritime trade.”
Indeed, the Las Anod conflict has increasingly been framed not as an internal dispute, but as part of China’s wider competition with Washington. “Every day of delay gives Beijing more time to create facts on the ground,” Cruz warned.
The fact that the CCP is this upset is even further reason that Trump should recognize Somaliland. https://t.co/MrezA9Sf6D
— Ted Cruz (@tedcruz) August 16, 2025
The Red Sea Chokepoint
At the heart of the contest is geography. Somaliland sits directly opposite Djibouti, home to China’s only overseas military base and a linchpin in its so-called “String of Pearls” network of ports and naval access points.
“Somaliland is effectively the blind spot in China’s maritime strategy,” said Bronwyn Bruton, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. “If the U.S. were to secure access to a base there, it would disrupt Beijing’s ability to dominate the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea.”
That strategic logic explains why Hargeisa has repeatedly offered to host a U.S. military presence. For Beijing, analysts note, such an outcome would be a nightmare: an American-aligned democracy sitting at the chokepoint of global commerce.
Mogadishu’s Parallel Campaign
Somalia’s federal government, aligned closely with Beijing, has also stepped up pressure. In a letter to Washington, Mogadishu claimed recognizing Somaliland “would embolden extremists and threaten stability in the Horn of Africa.”
Critics dismissed the warning. “Somalia has lost ground to al-Shabaab for years despite billions in aid and ongoing U.S. airstrikes,” noted Rashid Abdi, a Nairobi-based political analyst. “Meanwhile, Somaliland has managed to contain both al-Shabaab and ISIS without outside assistance. The contrast could not be sharper.”
Somalia’s claim that recognition would empower terrorists is seen in Washington as part of a coordinated strategy. “China applies the economic and diplomatic pressure, while Mogadishu uses the terrorism card,” one U.S. congressional staffer said. “It’s a divide-and-distract approach aimed at policymakers.”
An Axis of Disruption
Cruz and others warn that China’s destabilization efforts are linked to a broader authoritarian axis. Beijing’s close partnership with Tehran and its Houthi allies in Yemen raises the prospect of a two-front threat to global shipping.
“The Houthis have already demonstrated they can disrupt Red Sea commerce with limited means,” said retired Admiral James Stavridis. “If you add Chinese-backed militias across the strait in Somaliland, you risk a chokepoint crisis that could paralyze global trade.”
Defiance From Hargeisa and Taipei
Despite mounting pressure, Somaliland and Taiwan have shown little sign of retreat. The Somaliland Representative Office in Taipei reiterated its “inalienable right to self-determination,” while Taiwan’s Hargeisa office declared, “Neither Taiwan nor China is subordinate to the other.”
Their defiance underscores a key lesson: China’s Wolf Diplomacy may intimidate weaker states, but it falters against partners determined to resist.
Beijing Makes Cruz’s Case
In the end, Beijing’s forceful reaction has amplified rather than silenced Somaliland’s cause. “China’s tantrum has turned a policy debate into a geopolitical flashpoint,” said Shurkin. “That visibility only strengthens Cruz’s hand.”
For Washington, the dilemma is sharpening. Each day of inaction allows Beijing to deepen its foothold through proxies and partners. But swift recognition of Somaliland would mark a dramatic break from decades of U.S. policy.
“China thought it could bury the issue with threats,” Cruz concluded. “Instead, they’ve proven why Somaliland recognition is in America’s strategic interest.”
