Ethiopia reassesses Somaliland’s strategic value amid growing Red Sea competition, maritime access concerns and shifting regional geopolitics following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland
ADDIS ABABA — As the Republic of Somaliland marked the 35th anniversary of the restoration of its sovereignty on May 18, renewed attention has turned toward neighboring Ethiopia and whether Addis Ababa could eventually move toward formal recognition of Somaliland amid intensifying geopolitical competition along the Red Sea corridor.
The debate, once considered politically stalled after the collapse of momentum surrounding the controversial 2024 Ethiopia–Somaliland memorandum of understanding (MoU), has quietly resurfaced in diplomatic circles following recent high-level engagements between Ethiopian officials and policymakers in Washington.
While Ethiopian authorities have given no public indication that recognition is imminent, analysts and diplomats say Addis Ababa continues to weigh Somaliland’s strategic importance as it searches for long-term maritime access and broader regional influence.
The issue has gained additional momentum after Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland last year, a move that dramatically altered diplomatic calculations across the Horn of Africa and emboldened Somaliland’s international campaign for recognition.
In Hargeisa, this year’s May 18 celebrations were held under the theme “Recognition and Resilience,” reflecting growing confidence among Somaliland officials that international perceptions are shifting after more than three decades of de facto self-rule.
Yet despite speculation that Ethiopia could follow Israel’s lead, Addis Ababa has so far maintained what observers describe as “strategic ambiguity.”
“Ethiopia paused the Somaliland track because the diplomatic costs became too high at the time,” a Horn of Africa diplomat familiar with regional discussions told Addis Standard. “But the underlying issue — Ethiopia’s search for secure and sovereign maritime access — remains unresolved.”
Maritime access remains central to Ethiopia’s strategy
The strategic logic underpinning the January 2024 MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland has not disappeared, analysts say, even after regional backlash forced Addis Ababa to recalibrate its approach.
The agreement, signed under former Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, reportedly envisioned Ethiopian commercial port access and a potential naval facility along Somaliland’s coast in exchange for eventual recognition of Somaliland’s statehood.
The deal triggered a fierce reaction from Somalia, which condemned the agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Regional organizations including the African Union, Arab League and several Middle Eastern states also voiced opposition.
The resulting diplomatic crisis eventually led to Turkish-mediated rapprochement between Somalia and Ethiopia under the Ankara Declaration, sidelining implementation of the MoU.
Still, Ethiopia’s broader maritime ambitions remain unresolved.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly framed access to the sea as an existential issue for Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous country, which lost direct access to the Red Sea following Eritrea’s independence in 1993.
“From a purely strategic standpoint, Somaliland offers Ethiopia something no other partner currently does: relatively stable, geographically proximate access to the Gulf of Aden outside Somalia’s direct control,” a regional security analyst told Addis Standard.
For Ethiopian policymakers, Somaliland’s port of Berbera continues to hold significant strategic value as Addis Ababa seeks alternatives to its overwhelming dependence on Djibouti for maritime trade.
Washington diplomacy fuels new speculation
Renewed attention to the Somaliland question intensified following recent visits to Washington by Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timotheos and other senior officials as part of the U.S.–Ethiopia Bilateral Structured Dialogue.
The Ethiopian delegation, which included intelligence chief Redwan Hussein and senior adviser Girma Birru, met with U.S. officials to discuss security cooperation, regional stability, trade and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
However, observers focused particular attention on meetings involving Republican Senator Ted Cruz, Congressman Brian Mast and policy researchers at the Hudson Institute — circles viewed by Somaliland supporters as increasingly receptive to Somaliland’s strategic role in Red Sea security.
A Somaliland diplomatic source described the meetings as “encouraging signals.”
“There is growing understanding internationally that Somaliland’s stability matters for Red Sea security,” the source said. “For Ethiopia, the strategic value of partnership with Somaliland has only increased, not diminished.”
The source added that Ethiopia remains “the most consequential potential recognition” for Somaliland after Israel due to Addis Ababa’s regional influence and historical ties with Hargeisa.
Recognition remains politically sensitive
Despite growing strategic calculations, analysts say Ethiopia faces major diplomatic constraints that make formal recognition politically risky.
The African Union has historically opposed altering colonial-era borders, fearing recognition of Somaliland could encourage separatist movements elsewhere on the continent. Ethiopia, as host of the AU headquarters, faces particular institutional pressure to avoid challenging that consensus.
“There are limits to how far Ethiopia can move without creating major continental repercussions,” an African diplomat based in Addis Ababa told Addis Standard. “Recognition would not simply affect Somalia; it would challenge a foundational AU principle.”
Somalia’s government, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has consistently rejected any unilateral recognition of Somaliland and has urged regional actors to respect Somalia’s territorial integrity.
Turkey’s expanding influence in the Horn of Africa has further complicated Ethiopia’s calculations. Ankara has simultaneously emerged as a mediator between Somalia and Ethiopia, a close security partner to Mogadishu and an increasingly influential actor in Red Sea geopolitics.
“Ethiopia now has to balance multiple competing relationships,” another regional observer said. “On one side there is the long-term strategic attraction of Somaliland and Berbera. On the other side are relations with Somalia, Turkey, the AU and Arab states that remain firmly opposed to recognition.”
Somaliland pushes forward diplomatically
Inside Somaliland, officials continue to intensify diplomatic outreach, arguing that the republic has fulfilled the practical requirements of statehood through decades of relative peace, democratic elections and functioning institutions.
Even so, the 2024 MoU generated domestic controversy in Somaliland, with critics warning that aspects of the agreement could compromise sovereignty despite promises of eventual recognition.
Former President Muse Bihi later acknowledged that mounting international pressure contributed to the collapse of the agreement before it could become binding.
Still, Somaliland officials believe Israel’s recognition fundamentally changed diplomatic perceptions.
“Before Israel, recognition felt theoretical,” a Somaliland diplomatic source told Addis Standard. “Now countries are quietly reassessing their positions, even if they are not ready to say so publicly.”
For now, Ethiopia appears determined to preserve flexibility — avoiding formal recognition while maintaining strategic ties with Somaliland as regional competition over ports, trade routes and maritime security intensifies.
But diplomats say one reality is increasingly difficult to ignore: the geopolitical debate unleashed by the 2024 MoU may have slowed, but it has not disappeared.
