Gateways to the Red Sea: The Strategic Imperative for Israel-Somaliland Normalization
Hargeisa, Somaliland — In the volatile landscape of the Horn of Africa, Somaliland, with 34 years of de facto independence, is emerging as an unexpected linchpin for Middle Eastern security and Red Sea commerce. Somaliland, unrecognized yet undeniably functional, stands at the center of a geopolitical realignment that could reshape regional power dynamics and offer Israel a critical gateway to secure its maritime interests.
Strategic Geography: The Prize of Position
With its 530-mile coastline commanding the southern approach to the Bab al-Mandab Strait, Somaliland occupies what military strategists call “geopolitical gold.” Nearly one-third of global shipping transits this chokepoint, making it indispensable to world trade and energy flows. Recent months have seen this waterway threatened by Iran-backed Houthi rebels, who since late 2023 have launched over one hundred attacks on commercial vessels, triggering international rerouting that adds weeks to shipping times and inflates costs.
“Somaliland’s location places it at the center of efforts to secure one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors,” notes Amit Yarom, a Gulf specialist at George Washington University. “Unlike neighboring Somalia, it has largely succeeded in keeping extremist groups and piracy at bay through an increasingly developed coast guard and naval cooperation.”
Governance Without Recognition: The Somaliland Paradox
Despite functioning as a sovereign state since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland exists in diplomatic limbo. It boasts its own constitution, currency, military, and democratic institutions—contrasting sharply with Somalia’s instability. Freedom House’s 2025 ratings underscore this divide: Somaliland scores 47/100 for political rights and civil liberties, while Somalia languishes at 8/100.
Table: Somaliland vs. Somalia Governance Indicators
| Metric | Somaliland | Somalia |
|
Freedom House Score (2025) |
47/100 | 8/100 |
| Security Control | Internal | Partial |
| Political System | Multi-party | Transitional |
| Key Infrastructure | Berbera Port | Mogadishu Port |
Nevertheless, adherence to the African Union’s “One-Somalia” policy has prevented formal recognition. This hasn’t stopped pragmatic engagement: the UAE maintains a $442 million port investment at Berbera, Taiwan and Ethiopia run representative offices, and U.S. lawmakers have made bipartisan visits to Hargeisa.
Historical Context and Shifting Positions
Israel’s engagement with Somaliland dates to 1960, when it briefly recognized Somaliland’s independence before its merger with Italian Somalia. In 2010, Israel’s Foreign Ministry signaled readiness to renew recognition if approached. The 2020 Abraham Accords triggered another shift, with Somaliland publicly supporting UAE-Israel normalization.
The most significant development came in April 2025, when Somaliland Foreign Minister Abdirahman Adam stated: “Somaliland considers its foreign relations through the lens of national interest, regional stability, and the values of its people. If those align, we are open to discussion with any nation”. This carefully worded openness coincides with Somaliland’s aggressive push for U.S. recognition, offering critical minerals and military base access in exchange.
Security Imperatives: Countering Threats in the Red Sea
For Israel, the stakes are existential. The Houthi blockade has directly targeted Israel-bound shipping, endangering a corridor carrying 30% of its trade. Intelligence suggests Israel already operates monitoring facilities in Eritrea’s Dahlak Archipelago to watch Iran. Now, reports indicate Somaliland may allow an Israeli base on its soil—a move that would dramatically enhance maritime surveillance capabilities.
“Military cooperation could provide Israel strategic depth,” explains Yarom. “Trilateral U.S.-Israel-Somaliland maritime exercises and intelligence sharing would counterbalance Iranian influence and secure the Bab al-Mandab”. Such cooperation aligns with U.S. interests, particularly as China expands its nearby Djibouti base and Turkey deepens ties with Somalia.
Regional Power Plays
The Horn of Africa has become an arena for global competition:
- UAE: Maintains a military base and port investment in Berbera
- Turkey: Trains Somali forces and operates Mogadishu’s largest foreign base
- China: Runs a massive naval facility in Djibouti
- U.S.: Operates Camp Lemonnier—its largest African base—in Djibouti
Table: Foreign Military Interests in the Horn of Africa
| Country | Key Assets | Primary Interests |
|---|---|---|
| UAE | Berbera Port, military base | Maritime security, trade routes |
| China | Naval base in Djibouti | Belt and Road, blue-water navy |
| Turkey | Military training center, Mogadishu | Regional influence, Somalia ties |
| USA | Camp Lemonnier (Djibouti) | Counterterrorism, maritime security |
An Israel-Somaliland partnership would leverage Abu Dhabi’s foothold, creating an informal UAE-Israel-Somaliland axis. But risks abound: Turkey would likely boost support for Somalia, while Iran could activate Houthi proxies against Somaliland targets.
Economic Synergies: Beyond Security
Somaliland’s livestock-dependent economy seeks diversification, while Israel possesses cutting-edge agri-tech and infrastructure expertise. The Berbera port—handling 500,000 containers annually—could become a hub linking Israeli ports (Eilat/Ashdod) to African markets. This would simultaneously bolster landlocked Ethiopia, reducing its dependence on Chinese-influenced Djibouti.
“Collaboration in port logistics, security, and supply chains would attract investment,” argues Yarom. “It extends the Abraham Accords’ model of peace through prosperity”. Somaliland also holds untapped uranium and rare earth minerals, offering supply chain alternatives for U.S. and Israeli tech sectors.
The Recognition Dilemma
Somaliland’s status remains the elephant in the room. The African Union fiercely defends Somalia’s territorial integrity, fearing a “domino effect” on secessionist movements. Mogadishu has previously punished engagement—sanctioning Taiwan and UAE for their Somaliland ties.
However, winds may be shifting. Late 2024 reports suggested the Trump administration considered recognition. Should Washington move first, Israel could follow, replicating Morocco’s Western Sahara recognition deal through normalization. Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi’s upcoming Washington visit signals serious dialogue.
A Phased Pathway Forward
Experts recommend graduated engagement:
- Establish Liaison Offices: Mirroring U.S./UAE/Taiwan models in Hargeisa
- Launch Development Projects: Israeli NGOs like Save a Child’s Heart could build goodwill
- Conduct Maritime Drills: Joint U.S.-Israel-Somaliland anti-piracy patrols
- Pursue Multilateral Frameworks: Leverage the I2U2 (India-Israel-UAE-U.S.) format
Critically, Gaza de-escalation would ease Somaliland’s domestic and regional pressures. Recent rumors linking Somaliland to Gaza resettlement plans drew fierce denials from Hargeisa, underscoring sensitivities.
The Stakes
For Israel, the partnership offers:
- Enhanced Red Sea security against Houthi threats
- Counterbalance to Iranian/Turkish influence
- Access to African markets via Berbera corridor
For Somaliland:
- Pathway to international recognition
- Economic development through Israeli technology
- Security cooperation against al-Shabaab
As global powers jockey for position along the Red Sea, this unrecognized republic may hold keys to stabilizing one of the world’s most critical waterways. The path demands careful diplomacy, but the rewards—a more secure Red Sea and a bridge between Africa and the Middle East—could redefine regional stability.
“If pursued with strategic foresight,” concludes Yarom, “this partnership could anchor a more cooperative Red Sea region—proving that sometimes the most consequential bridges are built by the unlikeliest partners.”
